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age	 the	 Turkish	 government	 to	 avoid	 crises	 in	 its	 relations	
with	the	EU,	or	to	at	least	mitigate	the	impact	of	any	potential	
diplomatic	fallouts.






































a	 source	of	 inspiration	on	how	 to	organise	 the	 state,	 society	
and	economy.	In	this	respect,	European	norms	and	republican-	




































the	AKP	government’s	 rhetoric	 about	 the	EU	has	been	 increas-









who	 challenge	 some	 elements	 of	 the	 world	 order	 established	
by	the	West.1
This	paints	a	picture	of	Turkey	as	a	country	that	has	abandoned	
the	 plan	 championed	 by	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk	 to	 transform	
the	Turkish	state	and	society	on	the	basis	of	the	European	model.	
It	 also	 shows	Turkey	 as	 a	 country	 that	has	 abandoned	 its	 plans	
for	 integration	with	 Europe.	 In	 this	 view,	 both	 objectives	 have	
been	replaced	by	a	development	plan	based	on	Turkey’s	own	path,	


































This	paper	 argues	 that	 these	 fears	 are	 grossly	 exaggerated.	De-
spite	 visible	 shifts	 in	 Turkey’s	 rhetoric,	 domestic	 and	 foreign	
policy,	 coupled	with	 geopolitical	 changes	 across	 the	 region	 and	
within	the	European	Union	itself,	over	the	next	few	years	at	least	
the	European	Union	is	likely	to	retain	its	position	as	Ankara’s	key	


















i. the AKp’s Attitude to turKey’s eu 
integrAtion
Over	the	past	decade,	Turkey’s	political	scene	has	been	dominated	
by	 the	 Justice	 and	Development	 Party	 (AKP),	which	 has	 played	
a	key	role	in	shaping	Turkey’s	foreign	policy,	obviously	including	
its	policy	towards	the	European	Union.	 It	 is	 likely	that	over	the	









































negotiations.	 Initially	 these	 efforts	 were	 made,	 despite	 opposi-
tion	from	a	substantial	part	of	its	electorate.4	To	achieve	this	goal,	









The	 AKP’s	 dedication	 to	 the	 cause	 of	 Europeanisation	was	 also	
visible	 in	 the	 scope	of	 internal	 reforms	undertaken	by	 the	gov-
ernment	 of	 Prime	Minister	 Recep	 Tayyip	 Erdoğan,	which	 have	










were	 implemented	 in	 the	 judicial	 system	 and	 public	 adminis-
























were	blocked,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	 the	 free	movement	 of	
goods,	financial	services	and	agriculture.	The	party	leadership’s	
declaration	that	Turkey	would	align	its	legislation	with	the	stand-























are	 reported	 in	Turkish	media	 very	 frequently.	 It	 appears	 that	 this	 cam-





































eral	democracy	promoted	by	 the	EU,	and	 that	 the	government’s	
official	pro-integration	stance	is	being	treated	merely	instrumen-
tally	 and	 does	 not	 stem	 from	 a	 genuine	 feeling	 of	 belonging	 to	
a	European	community	of	values.	To	some,	these	suspicions	are	
further	 strengthened	by	 the	political	 lineage	of	 the	AKP.	 In	 the	





































3. The AKP: a European-Islamic-Kemalist mix
Taking	the	above	into	account,	 it	would	be	erroneous	to	see	the	
AKP	as	a	uniquely	European	force	that	fully	shares	all	the	values	






Nonetheless,	 it	would	be	 equally	 remiss	 to	describe	 the	AKP	as	


























abolishing	 the	 restrictions	 imposed	 by	 the	 Kemalist	 system	 on	
the	religious	practices	of	the	majority	of	Turkey’s	Sunni	Muslims.	
The	 attempts	 to	 impose	 Islamic	 norms	 on	 Turkish	 society	 have	
so	 far	 been	 incidental:	 these	 have	 included	 partial	 restrictions	
on	 the	marketing	of	alcohol,	a	 subsequently	abandoned	attempt	
to	 criminalise	 adultery,	 and	 a	 political	 campaign	 against	 abor-
tion	 (although	 under	 public	 pressure	 the	 government	 stepped	




individuals	rather	 than	 the	public	 sphere.	 It	has	 to	be	admitted	
though,	that	to	some	extent	Islamic	values	have	influenced	Tur-
key’s	foreign	policy,	as	manifested	by	Ankara’s	growing	involve-




In	 addition,	 the	 view	 that	 Turkey’s	 EU	 integration	 agenda	 has	
purely	 instrumental	 foundations	 fails	 to	 explain	Ankara’s	 rela-
tively	consistent	efforts	at	political	and	economic	integration	with	
7	 The	influence	of	Islamic	ideology	on	the	AKP’s	domestic	policies	can	be	seen	


























necessary	simply	 to	conceal	 its	alleged	 ‘Islamic	agenda.’	 If	 there	








model	 approximating	 –	 albeit	 not	 identical	with	 –	Western	 de-








spheres,	 and	 gives	 it	 a	 dominant	 influence	 over	 social	 values	





direct	 elections,	 the	 general	public	 are	passive	 subjects	 rather	





























































































ii. the instrumentAlism of AnKArA’s 





tic	politics,	 in	 the	 economy	and	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	The	
















1. Europe as an instrument of political struggle































































































nies	operating	 in	 the	EU,	 and	 the	 inclusion	of	Turkish	 students	
in	EU	scholarship	programmes,	amongst	others.	Brussels’	finan-
cial	support	for	the	implementation	of	the	acquis communautaire	
in	Turkey	 is	another	 significant	 incentive.	Turkey	 is	 the	 largest	
for	71	AKP	members,	including	the	prime	minister	and	the	president.	The	
motion	was	ultimately	rejected	(by	just	one	vote).	This	was	the	second	mo-




























weakened	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 AKP’s	 claims	 that	 its	 political	
decisions	must	continue	to	reflect	 the	objective	of	EU	accession.	



















sume	accession	 talks	with	Turkey.	This	 raised	 serious	 concerns	
among	Erdoğan’s	ministers	about	the	public	reaction	to	a	possible	
14	 In	May	and	June	2013,	Turkey	saw	a	series	of	large-scale	protests	against	the	



























its	 domestic	 policy	 objectives.	 In	 those	 instances	 where	 short-
term	political	 interests	appear	to	be	more	important,	Erdoğan’s	
government	 is	 increasingly	willing	 to	 act	 on	 them,	 even	at	 the	
risk	of	opening	itself	up	to	criticism	from	Brussels.	Nonetheless,	
AKP	politicians	realise	that	although	the	benefits	of	the	current	











Under	 the	 AKP	 government,	 the	 economic	 ties	 between	 Tur-






















centage	 terms,	 their	 volume	has	nearly	 tripled	 from	 $20	billion	
in	2002	to	almost	$60	billion	in	2012	in	absolute	terms.16	It	is	im-
portant	to	note	that	Europe	is	currently	the	main,	and	almost	the	





tant	 factor	 stimulating	 innovation	 and	 enhancing	 the	 competi-
tiveness	of	the	Turkish	economy,	especially	since	the	global	trade	
in	low-tech	products	has	become	highly	competitive.18









































For	a	number	of	years,	 the	 share	of	EU	capital	 in	 foreign	direct	







Turkey	 is	 closely	 linked	 with	 the	 European	 economic	 system	
through	a	number	of	 institutions.	Formally,	 the	main	structure	





























































the	 temporary	 loss	of	European	markets;	partly,	however,	 they	were	also	
the	outcome	of	a	conscious	policy	to	promote	trade	relations	and	investment	
in	the	MENA	region.




























gests	 that	Turkey	 is	 expecting	 a	 slowdown	 in	 the	 rate	 at	which	
its	trade	with	the	region	could	grow	in	the	coming	years.29	In	ad-























29	 See	 Türkiye’nin	 Yeniden	 Konumlandırılması,	 http://ekonomi.gov.tr/up-
load/	98	C9FBB8-D8D3-8566-45209FC758B662CB/dtyr.pdf
































Turkey’s	 EU	 membership	 negotiations	 are	 regarded	 by	 foreign	
investors	as	a	guarantee	of	the	predictability	and	stability	of	 its	
economy.	Any	political	crisis	between	Ankara	and	Brussels	would	










ment	 in	Cairo	 introduced	restrictions	on	Turkish	companies	operating	 in	
Egypt,	 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uae-firm-may-exit-12-billion-
energy-project-in-turkey-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=53239




























3. Europe as a partner on the international stage
The	European	Union	and	 its	member	states	are	useful	partners	
for	Ankara	on	 the	 international	 stage,	even	 though	Turkey	sees	















Berlin’s	 official	 support	 for	 Ankara’s	 policy	 towards	 Syria	 has	










































in	October	2012,	after	Turkey	 forced	a	Russian	plane	 to	 land	on	suspicion	
that	it	was	carrying	weapons	for	the	Syrian	regime.	See	Szymon	Ananicz	
and	Witold	Rodkiewicz,	Turkish-Russian	tension	of	the	Syrian	crisis,	East-











































and	 Europe	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 Iranian	 nuclear	 programme,	
Israel,	 Palestine	 (Hamas),	 NATO’s	 intervention	 in	 Libya	 (in	 the	
planning	phase37)	and	the	military	coup	in	Egypt	–	might	indicate	


























iii. the public perception of turKey’s 

























litical,	 social	 and	 economic	 organisation.	 This	 view	 dates	 back	



















modelled	 on	 European	 powers.	 Europe’s	 favourable	 image	 has	
also	been	 reinforced	by	Turkey’s	Cold	War	alliance	with	NATO.	
Moreover,	 the	 positive	 accounts	 of	 Europe	 produced	 by	 Turk-


























































political	 model.	 The	 image	 of	 Europe	 in	 crisis	 contrasts	 with	
the	rapid	economic	growth	witnessed	in	Turkey,	and	promotes	
the	belief	that	Turkey	does	not	need	integration	with	Europe	to	




of	 intolerance	 against	Muslim	 immigrants	 in	 the	 EU	 (in	 2012,	
65%	of	respondents	believed	that	Europeans	were	xenophobic).43	
As	a	result,	there	is	a	growing	perception	in	Turkish	society	of	
a	 division	 between	 the	 Islamic	 world	 and	 the	 West,	 which	 is	
40	 Ibid.
41	 See	http://trends.gmfus.org/
42	 See	 Szymon	Ananicz,	 Cyprus	 presidency	 and	Turkey’s	 relations	with	 the	


































cent	 years.44	 This	 suggests	 that	Turkish	 attitudes	 to	Europe	 are	




























2. A rise in conservatism as a factor distancing Turkey 
from Europe?
While	it	seems	that	the	above-mentioned	factors	have	indeed	had	
a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 poor	 image	 of	 Europe	 in	 Turkey	 in	
recent	years,	it	would	be	much	harder	to	defend	the	widespread	
opinion	that	the	shift	 in	public	perception	of	the	West	has	been	














The	 studies	 also	 suggest	 that	Turkish	 society	 is	 becoming	more	
tolerant,	 and	 increasingly	 committed	 to	 political	 and	 religious	







TESEV	 2006,	 p.	 40,	 http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/a0c7	d243	-	
-50ec-48	77-9791-57d4b5bfd356/Degisen%20Turkiyede%20Din%20Top	lum	-	
	%20Siyaset%2011_2006.pdf
















































policy	 experts	 are	 in	 favour	 of	Turkey’s	EU	membership	 (the	 survey	was	
carried	 on	 a	 sample	 of	 202	 experts).	 Türkiye’de	 ve	Dis	 Politika	Kamuoyu	
Anketleri	2013/1,	http://edam.org.tr/document/EDAMAnketOcak2013.pdf	






























It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 the	 support	 for	 EU	 accession	
among	 Turkey’s	 conservative	 circles	 –	 for	 example,	 among	 the	
Kurds	 and	 within	 Fethullah	 Gülen’s	 movement	 –	 is	 motivated	
largely	by	the	hope	that	European	integration	would	lead	to	the	
final	dismantling	of	the	Kemalist	system	that	these	segments	of	
society	perceive	 as	 a	 threat.	 It	 therefore	 follows	 that	 their	 sup-
port	for	EU	integration	does	not	necessarily	indicate	the	pursuit	
of	EU-style	liberal	democratic	principles.	It	is	likely	that	over	time	
the	 pro-EU	 orientation	 of	 these	 groups	will	 gradually	 diminish	
because	 the	 main	 restrictions	 imposed	 on	 religious	 life	 by	 the	








Foreign	 Policy	 Perceptions	 in	 Turkey,	 TESEV,	 2011,	 http://www.tesev.org.
tr/Upload/Publication/d40ab847-5676-4864-8f99-37fcb58ffc34/Foreign%20
Policy%20Perceptions%20in%20Turkey_05.2011.pdf






































the perception of europe And the future 
of turKey’s europeAn policy
It	 is	 not	 clear	whether	 the	 government	 in	Ankara	 still	 believes	











try’s	 development,	 and	 in	 turn	 strengthen	 its	 position	 on	 the	
political	 and	 international	 stage.	The	 relatively	 strong	 relation-
ship	between	the	 intensity	of	 this	cooperation	and	the	status	of	
the	 integration	 process	will	 highlight	 the	 benefit	 of	 continuing	
the	negotiations.
The	role	of	 the	 integration	process	 for	 the	AKP’s	position	 in	do-
mestic	politics	has	changed	in	recent	years.	The	role	of	the	process	








considered	 as,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 an	 expression	 of	 exasperation	
with	 its	 policy	 towards	 Turkey,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 as	 a	 way	 for	






















ist	 political	 force.	 This	would	 leave	Erdoğan’s	 government	 little	
room	for	manoeuvre,	and	it	is	possible	that	in	such	a	scenario	An-
kara	would	take	measures	to	delegitimise	the	EU.
The	 EU	 integration	 process	 does	 not	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	
















Turkish	 society.	 This	would	 reduce	 the	 EU’s	 influence	 over	 the	
position	of	the	AKP	on	the	political	stage,	since	the	EU	would	no	
longer	have	the	capacity	to	delegitimise	the	Turkish	government.	
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